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Moral Hazard. Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders?

By: Lane, Timothy.

Contributor(s): Phillios, Steven | International Monetary Fund (IMF).

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BookSeries: Economic Issues 28.Publisher: Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002

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	Paper	WIIW Library									Available			10001382

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