000			01555nam a22002897u 4500
001			pwiiw3788
003			OSt
005			20260518120059.0
008			160208t2016 au ||||| |||| 00| ||eng d
040			_cOSt
041			_aeng
084			_aN40 _aN43 _aN44 _aO14 _aF15 _2jelc
100	1		_aGligorov, Vladimir
245	1	0	_aRussia’s Interventions: Counterrevolutionary Power
260			_aWien : _bWiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (wiiw), _c2016.
300			_a27 S., _b _c30cm.
490	1		_awiiw Essays and Occasional Papers _v1
520			_aAbstract The key point is about Russia, old and new, being a counterrevolutionary power: Russia’s post-Napoleonic War and moreover post-1848 policy was counterrevolutionary abroad and conservative, even when reformist, at home, as is Russia’s current post-Soviet, post-Cold War policy. However, while the current foreign policy end is Russian, the instruments of intervention, e.g. in Syria, are Soviet. The main difference as compared to both, Tsarist Russian and Soviet, is Russia’s lack of a universalistic ideological justification now, notwithstanding all the attempts to revive the ideology of the Russian cultural and civilisational exceptionalism to supress liberal changes at home, and for that reason also abroad.
650			_aRussia
650			_aforeign policy
650			_aindustrialisation
650			_aEU
651			_aRussia
830		0	_v1 _wWIIW0000122 _twiiw Essays and Occasional Papers
856	4	0	_uhttps://wiiw.ac.at/p-3788.html
942			_cP
999			_c8629 _d8629