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001			pwiiw7279
003			OSt
005			20260518120035.0
008			250401t2025 au ||||| |||| 00| ||eng d
040			_cOSt
041			_aeng
084			_aF21 _aF35 _aH81 _2jelc
100	1		_aJovanović, Branimir
245	1	0	_aThe EU’s and China’s grants and loans in the Western Balkans
260			_aWien : _bWiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (wiiw), _c2025.
300			_a37 S., _b10 Tables and 7 Figures, _c30cm.
490	1		_awiiw Policy Notes and Reports _v92
520			_aThis note examines the grants and loans provided by the European Union (EU) and China to the Western Balkan economies. The EU remains dominant in grant funding, with annual Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) grants averaging 0.8% of the region’s GDP, far above the 0.02% of GDP from Chinese grants. In terms of loans, however, China has nearly caught up with the EU. On an annual basis, the EU has committed loans equal to approximately 1.5% of the region’s GDP, while China has provided loans in the amount of 1.2%. Notably, in Serbia, China’s loan portfolio now exceeds the size of the EU’s. EU loans are cheaper and more transparent but come with stricter conditions for implementation and requirements for institutional reforms. In contrast, Chinese loans are more flexible and quicker to implement, making them appealing to Western Balkan politicians. However, this flexibility comes at a cost, as Chinese loans are significantly more susceptible to corruption, often deliver questionable quality, and have been linked to various drawbacks, such as workers’ rights violations and environmental degradation.
650			_aEU
650			_aChina
650			_aWestern Balkans
650			_agrants
650			_aloans
650			_ainvestment
651			_aAlbania
651			_aBosnia and Herzegovina
651			_aKosovo
651			_aMontenegro
651			_aNorth Macedonia
651			_aSerbia
651			_aWestern Balkans
690			_aMacroeconomic Analysis and Policy
700	1		_aStojadinović, Sonja
830		0	_v92 _wWIIW0000092 _twiiw Policy Notes and Reports
856	4	0	_uhttps://wiiw.ac.at/p-7279.html
942			_cP
999			_c9113 _d9113